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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kotsogiannis, Christos | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schwager, Robert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather thanin a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to thecontrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontalinformation externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents asimple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competitionpolitical actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In theequilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system. Itis thus shown that, once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom islikely to be a valid proposition. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1585 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.jel | R59 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fiscal federalism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | policy innovation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | policy experimentation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Föderalismus | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Innovation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | On the incentives to experiment in federations | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503740160 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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