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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Konrad, Kai A. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Skaperdas, Stergios | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:54:39Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:54:39Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1578 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | property rights | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | anarchy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | government | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kriminalitätsökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Innere Sicherheit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Sicherheitsgewerbe | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Organisierte Kriminalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The market for protection and the origin of the state | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 503713147 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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