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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042-
dc.description.abstractWe examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1578en_US
dc.subject.jelH10en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernmenten_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwInnere Sicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwSicherheitsgewerbeen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe market for protection and the origin of the stateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503713147en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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