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dc.contributor.authorde Bijl, Paul W. J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:29Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19018-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an economist?s perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ?local loop?, or local access network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent?s competitive stance in the wholesale market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1554en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL4en_US
dc.subject.jelL96en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwTelekommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebsaufspaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwNetzzugangen_US
dc.subject.stwTelekommunikationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStructural separation and access in telecommunications marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503670634en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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