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dc.contributor.authorBuchholz, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeters, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000-
dc.description.abstractThe Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In the present paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some simple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a nonenvy postulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with different preferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtual prices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can be perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1536en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLindahl equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordequityen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleJustifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500850879en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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