Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBuchholz, Wolfgangen
dc.contributor.authorPeters, Wolfgangen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000-
dc.description.abstractThe Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Eventhough the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself hisapproach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In thepresent paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from somesimple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a nonenvypostulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with differentpreferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtualprices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can beperceived as an outcome of fair cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1536en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordLindahl equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordequityen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleJustifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500850879en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.