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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:21Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998-
dc.description.abstractLeaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order topreempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect thepower of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possiblesuccession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regimeand the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of theprevious leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supportersreceive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fightharder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to inducethe divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1534en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelN40en
dc.subject.jelH50en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpolitical leadershipen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical supporten
dc.subject.keywordpolitical survivalen
dc.subject.keywordsuccessorshipen
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren
dc.subject.stwRegierungswechselen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSuccession rules and leadership rents-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500841365en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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