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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:21Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998-
dc.description.abstractLeaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1534en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelN40en_US
dc.subject.jelH50en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical leadershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical supporten_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical survivalen_US
dc.subject.keywordsuccessorshipen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungswechselen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSuccession rules and leadership rentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500841365en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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