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dc.contributor.authorBreitscheidel, Jörgen_US
dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:18Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992-
dc.description.abstractWe explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be solved by setting subsidies. Under Bertrand competition, only announcing the tax rate can induce at least one firm to invest. We suggest that feebate systems in the automotive sector should be designed as self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1528en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtaxes and subsidiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-financing mechanismsen_US
dc.subject.keywordemission controlen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen_US
dc.subject.stwSubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwhold-up problemsen_US
dc.titleSelf-financing environmental mechanismsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500828423en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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