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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1523
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
merger policy
international trade
JEL: 
H77
F13
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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