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Title:Merger policy to promote "global players"? : A simple model PDF Logo
Authors:Haufler, Andreas
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1523
Abstract:We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
Subjects:merger policy
international trade
JEL:H77
F13
L41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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