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Title:Strategic tax competition in Switzerland : evidence from a panel of the Swiss cantons PDF Logo
Authors:Feld, Lars
Reulier, Emmanuelle
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1516
Abstract:Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions with – ceteris paribus – lower tax rates and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, the income tax rates in cantons are lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.
Subjects:tax competition
strategic tax setting
personal income taxes
JEL:H71
H24
H73
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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