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dc.contributor.authorKhalil, Fahaden_US
dc.contributor.authorMartimort, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:12Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be so strong that there may even be less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with each other, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive monitoring.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1514en_US
dc.subject.jelG3en_US
dc.subject.jelG2en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelD2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcostly state verificationen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMonitoring a common agent : implications for financial contractingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500538069en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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