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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18966
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Matschke, Xenia | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:54:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:54:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18966 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows within a standard protection for sale framework, how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation may make export subsidies less desirable and import tariffs more desirable. The model is then estimated and its predictions are tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1502 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F16 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | protection for sale | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tariffs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | trade protection | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenhandelspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenhandelsbeschränkung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuererhebung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schätzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | USA | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | protection for sale | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 500519218 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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