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dc.contributor.authorAmegashie, J. Atsuen_US
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:07Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1500en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordelimination contestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpotential rivalen_US
dc.subject.keywordsabotageen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleSabotaging potential rivalsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500517312en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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