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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Amegashie, J. Atsu | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Runkel, Marco | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:54:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:54:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1500 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D74 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | all-pay auction | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | elimination contests | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | potential rival | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | sabotage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftskriminalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Auktionstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Sabotaging potential rivals | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 500517312 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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