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Title:Sabotaging potential rivals PDF Logo
Authors:Amegashie, J. Atsu
Runkel, Marco
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1500
Abstract:This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.
Subjects:all-pay auction
elimination contests
potential rival
sabotage
JEL:D74
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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