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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964
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| Title: | | Sabotaging potential rivals  |
| Authors: | | Amegashie, J. Atsu Runkel, Marco |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1500 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. |
| Subjects: | | all-pay auction elimination contests potential rival sabotage |
| JEL: | | D74 D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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