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dc.contributor.authorLengwiler, Yvanen_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952-
dc.description.abstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1488en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordright of first refusalen_US
dc.subject.keywordnumerical methodsen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn50046619Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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