Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952
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dc.contributor.authorLengwiler, Yvanen_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952-
dc.description.abstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We proposea model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder toeither lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibriumbidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, andwhy both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bidrigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimizeillegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working papers |x1488en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordright of first refusalen_US
dc.subject.keywordnumerical methodsen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn50046619Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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