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dc.contributor.authorGottardi, Pieroen_US
dc.contributor.authorSerrano, Robertoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18938-
dc.description.abstractWe study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the outcome depends both on the structure of the sellers? information and, even more importantly, on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules. When there is intense competition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to the buyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers. On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms of competition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information is never fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for many parameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even for large n.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1300en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation revelationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopolistic competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordclientelesen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMarket power and information revelation in dynamic tradingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn471198579en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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