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dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Kiraen
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931-
dc.description.abstractIn transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even ifthey have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economyperspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Ourmodel is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrativepositions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions canlead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioningfinancial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1293en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial marketsen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keyworddevelopmenten
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwFinanzsektoren
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856949817en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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