Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931
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dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Kiraen_US
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931-
dc.description.abstractIn transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even ifthey have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economyperspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Ourmodel is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrativepositions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions canlead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioningfinancial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working papers |x1293en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddevelopmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzsektoren_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856949817en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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