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dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Kiraen_US
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931-
dc.description.abstractIn transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even if they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1293en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddevelopmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzsektoren_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn472779281en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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