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dc.contributor.authorMaffei, Sandroen_US
dc.contributor.authorRaabe, Nikolaien_US
dc.contributor.authorUrsprung, Heinrich W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:51Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18926-
dc.description.abstractMost normative studies on child labor arrive at the conclusion that child labor is detrimental to social welfare. Child labor is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries even though in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a politicaleconomic model that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labor legislation. The most important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimes enforcement is more lenient and child labor thus more prevalent than in countries enjoying political freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1288en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordchild laboren_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordfreedomen_US
dc.subject.stwKinderarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwJugendarbeitsschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Verfolgungen_US
dc.subject.stwFreiheiten_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titlePolitical repression and child labor : theory and empirical evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn471338877en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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