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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18917
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Falkinger, Josef | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Grossmann, Volker | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:53:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:53:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18917 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper argues that openness to goods trade in combination with an unequal distribution of political power has been a major determinant of the comparatively slow development of resource- or land-abundant regions like South America and the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model with a tax-financed public sector, and show that in a feudal society (dominated by landed elites) productivity-enhancing public investments like the provision of schooling are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to trade, development is faster in a democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and demonstrate that, in political equilibrium, a land-abundant and landowner-dominated economy supports openness to trade. Finally, we discuss empirical evidence which strongly supports our basic hypotheses. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1279 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | N16 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | N10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | F43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | economic development | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | institutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political system | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | public education | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | trade | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politik der offenen Tür | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politisches System | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Welt | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Institutions and development : the interaction between trade regime and political system | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 470772239 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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