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dc.contributor.authorBlumkin, Tomeren_US
dc.contributor.authorGrossmann, Volkeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18912-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a dynamic two-party political economy framework, in which parties seek to maximize vote share and face the trade-off between catering to their respective core constituencies on the one hand and ?middle of the road? voters with no partisan affiliation on the other hand. In contrast to ideology-driven individuals, ?middle of the road? voters care about the state of the economy in the sense that a policy reform is desirable for them when the fundamentals of the economy change. However, information is ?sticky? in the sense that the process of information diffusion about the state of the economy, which is determined by some exogenous stochastic process, is imperfect. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that an increase in ideological polarization may enhance social welfare by mitigating the friction in information flow.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1274en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordideological polarizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsticky informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartisanshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy reformen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsreformen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwIdeologieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIdeological polarization, sticky information, and policy reformsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn397002432en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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