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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18909
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Orosel, Gerhard O. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Zauner, Klaus G. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18909 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good's quality is unobservableto buyers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, andminimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the true quality ofthe good is revealed with positive probability. To provide firms with incentives to actuallydeliver promised quality, prices must exceed marginal cost. We derive sufficient conditionsfor these incentive constraints to determine equilibrium prices, and show that under certainconditions only one or both of the extreme levels of quality, minimum and maximum quality,are available in the market. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1271 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L15 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experience goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | product differentiation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | product quality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktdifferenzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktqualität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Informationsverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktinformation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Erfahrungsgüter | en |
dc.title | Vertical product differentiation when quality is unobservable to buyers | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856889008 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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