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dc.contributor.authorOrosel, Gerhard O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorZauner, Klaus G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:44Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18909-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good?s quality is unobservable to buyers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed with positive probability. To provide firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed marginal cost. We derive sufficient conditions for these incentive constraints to determine equilibrium prices, and show that under certain conditions only one or both of the extreme levels of quality, minimum and maximum quality, are available in the market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1271en_US
dc.subject.jelL15en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexperience goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct differentiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct qualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktinformationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwErfahrungsgüteren_US
dc.titleVertical product differentiation when quality is unobservable to buyersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn395724457en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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