EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904-
dc.description.abstractThe implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1266en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn472458817en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
cesifo1_wp1266.pdf204.74 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.