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dc.contributor.authorPonssard, Jean-Pierreen_US
dc.contributor.authorLarmande, Françoisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18895-
dc.description.abstractIncentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90?s, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions ist properties along the controllability dimension. The question is addressed through an in-depth case study: after three years in operation the actual bonuses paid by the system, as well as qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed. It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major controllability problem.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1257en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEVA management compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontrollability-congruence trade-offen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompensation standardsen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Wertschöpfungen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.titleEVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn396975186en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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