Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18891 
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dc.contributor.authorvan Long, Ngoen
dc.contributor.authorSorger, Gerharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:36Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18891-
dc.description.abstractWe extend the model of insecure property rights by Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornelland Lane (1999) by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves aprivate appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption,and (iii) agents can be heterogeneous. We show that both an increase in the appropriation costand, when appropriation costs vary across agents, an increase in the degree of heterogeneityof these costs reduce the growth rate of the public capital stock. We also show that, in theinterior equilibrium, the private asset can have either a lower or a higher money rate of returnthan the common property asset.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1253en
dc.subject.jelO40en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.keywordappropriation costen
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInsecure property rights and growth : the roles of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856741485en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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