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dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeichenrieder, Alfons J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:33Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18882-
dc.description.abstractDeposit systems for one-way beverage containers are widely supported by green activists and have been implemented in several countries. This paper analyzes whether such deposit systems can optimally internalize the externalities that result when consumers dump these containers. It is shown that two major problems arise in a competitive market. First, the proceeds from bottle deposits tend to reduce the price of beverages in a competitive environment and therefore lead to a departure from a first best allocation. Second, the system usually requires producers and vendors to run a system for taking back and recycling used containers, whose cost vendors can only partly shift to consumers who return their bottles. While a deposit system alone is never optimal, the paper proposes tax-deposit systems that can implement a first-best allocation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1243en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwGetränkeverpackungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerpackungs-Recyclingen_US
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the economics of bottle depositsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn393482855en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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