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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18882
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Eggert, Wolfgang | en |
dc.contributor.author | Weichenrieder, Alfons J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18882 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Deposit systems for one-way beverage containers are widely supported by greenactivists and have been implemented in several countries. This paper analyzeswhether such deposit systems can optimally internalize the externalities that resultwhen consumers dump these containers. It is shown that two major problems arisein a competitive market. First, the proceeds from bottle deposits tend to reduce theprice of beverages in a competitive environment and therefore lead to a departurefrom a first best allocation. Second, the system usually requires producers andvendors to run a system for taking back and recycling used containers, whose costvendors can only partly shift to consumers who return their bottles. While adeposit system alone is never optimal, the paper proposes tax-deposit systems thatcan implement a first-best allocation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1243 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q20 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H23 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Getränkeverpackung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verpackungs-Recycling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internalisierung externer Effekte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | On the economics of bottle deposits | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856730726 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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