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dc.contributor.authorDelfgaauw, Josseen_US
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18862-
dc.description.abstractCivil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort is verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as public goods come at a lower cost.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1223en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.jelL3en_US
dc.subject.jelJ4en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic sector labour marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwork ethicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic service motivationen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen_US
dc.titleIncentives and workers' motivation in the public sectoren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn390922269en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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