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dc.contributor.authorEvers, Michielen_US
dc.contributor.authorDe Mooij, Ruud A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorVollebergh, Herman R. J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:23Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18860-
dc.description.abstractThis paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors? tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1221en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.jelR4en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDiesel exciseen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic tax settingen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum ratesen_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Unionen_US
dc.subject.stwDieselkraftstoffen_US
dc.subject.stwMineralölsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Steuerrechten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleTax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excisesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn390922080en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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