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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18856
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| Title: | | Adverse selection in an insurance market with government-guaranteed subsistence levels  |
| Authors: | | Kim, Bum J. Schlesinger, Harris |
| Issue Date: | | 2004 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1217 |
| Abstract: | | We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government-sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection. |
| Subjects: | | adverse selection insurance government relief |
| JEL: | | D82 H29 G22 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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