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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Konrad, Kai A. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:53:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:53:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1473 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D44 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | all-pay auctions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | externalities | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | contests | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | silent minority shareholdings | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | ownership structure | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Auktionstheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Stille Gesellschaft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eigentümerstruktur | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Silent interests and all-pay auctions | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 488944813 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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