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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837 | - |
dc.description.abstract | If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduceasymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a largeshare in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. Asa consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocatedless efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of thefirms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1473 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | all-pay auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | externalities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contests | en |
dc.subject.keyword | silent minority shareholdings | en |
dc.subject.keyword | ownership structure | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Stille Gesellschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eigentümerstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Silent interests and all-pay auctions | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 488944813 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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