|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837
|
| | |
| Title: | | Silent interests and all-pay auctions  |
| Authors: | | Konrad, Kai A. |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1473 |
| Abstract: | | If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects. |
| Subjects: | | all-pay auctions externalities contests silent minority shareholdings ownership structure |
| JEL: | | L11 D44 L41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|