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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18832
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Frey, Bruno S. | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:53:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:53:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18832 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual?s desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1468 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Z13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | incentives | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | motivation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | awards | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | orders | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | distinction | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | principal-agent | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preisverleihung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsanreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Sozialer Status | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Leistungsmotivation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Knight fever : towards an economics of awards | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 488927129 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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