EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18832
  
Title:Knight fever : towards an economics of awards PDF Logo
Authors:Frey, Bruno S.
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1468
Abstract:Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual?s desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives.
Subjects:incentives
motivation
awards
orders
distinction
principal-agent
JEL:Z13
L22
J33
J22
D73
D23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
cesifo1_wp1468.pdf416.36 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18832

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.