EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18808
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDaido, Koheien_US
dc.contributor.authorItoh, Hideshien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18808-
dc.description.abstractWe attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by K?szegi and Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal?s expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1444en_US
dc.subject.jelM12en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelM52en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelB49en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordself-fulfilling prophecyen_US
dc.subject.keywordPygmalion effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordGalatea effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordreference dependent preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordagency modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwNutzenen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferencesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn48516292Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
cesifo1_wp1444.pdf274.51 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.