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dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:59Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801-
dc.description.abstractIn an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1437en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpay-as-you-goen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIntra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn485158213en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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