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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801
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| Title: | | Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers  |
| Authors: | | Kolmar, Martin Meier, Volker |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1437 |
| Abstract: | | In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms. |
| Subjects: | | pay-as-you-go externalities mechanism design adverse selection |
| JEL: | | H55 H23 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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