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Title:Optimal redistributive taxation when government's and agents' preferences differ PDF Logo
Authors:Blomquist, Sören
Micheletto, Luca
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1429
Abstract:Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals? preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz (1982) and Stern (1982), the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals? well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents.
Subjects:optimal taxation
behavioral economics
paternalism
merit goods
non-welfarism
JEL:H21
H23
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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