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dc.contributor.authorPitlik, Hansen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Friedrich G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorStrotmann, Haralden_US
dc.coverage.temporal1972-2000en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18790-
dc.description.abstractLegislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1426en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislative bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordoverrepresentationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal transfer systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordGermanyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleLegislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer systemen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn484747568en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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