Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bellettini, Giorgio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ceroni, Carlotta Berti | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneursand workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the unionleads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces awelfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view ofworkers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration,we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1421 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J61 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F22 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einwanderung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Migrationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | When the union hurts the workers : a positive analysis of immigration policy | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 484732897 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.