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dc.contributor.authorLuporini, Annalisaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:51Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18784-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market conditions, the problem takes the form of a principal multi-agent model. We first provide appropriate extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions that ensure the validity of the first-order approach in the single agent case. Then, we show that affiliation of the random variables is a necessary and sufficient condition for the compensation of one director to negatively and monotonically depend on the performance of the other.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1420en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent problemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelative performance evaluationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst-order approachen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonotone likelihood ratioen_US
dc.subject.keywordaffiliationen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganschaften_US
dc.subject.stwMathematische Optimierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleRelative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firmen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn484552201en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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