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dc.contributor.authorMalcomson, James M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:46Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18771-
dc.description.abstractSuppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but can observe neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision differs from what would be efficient if the purchaser had full information, whether or not the supplier can extract informational rent. The analysis is applied to, among other things, data on tests for coronary artery disease and to Medicare diagnosisrelated groups defined by the treatment given, not just the diagnosis, illustrating the biases in provision that result.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1407en_US
dc.subject.jelI18en_US
dc.subject.jelI11en_US
dc.subject.jelH42en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsupplier discretionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic provisionen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiagnosis-related groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmedicareen_US
dc.subject.keywordprospective paymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcost-effectivenessen_US
dc.subject.stwGesundheitsversorgungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwKosten-Wirksamkeits-Analyseen_US
dc.titleSupplier discretion over provision : theory and an application to medical careen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn479306605en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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