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dc.contributor.authorFrey, Bruno S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorOsterloh, Margiten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:34Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18743-
dc.description.abstractCorporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory?s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance, as selfish extrinsic motivation is reinforced. Based on the common pool approach to the firm, institutions are proposed which serve to raise intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. More importance is to be attributed to fixed pay and strengthening the legitimacy of authorities by procedural fairness, relational contracts and organizational citizenship behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1379en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordagency theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordintrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcrowding theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordmanagement compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpay for performanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordorganizational citizenshipen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwMotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskulturen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwintrinsic motivationen_US
dc.titleYes, managers should be paid like bureaucratsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn479117683en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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