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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18740
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| Title: | | Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU : spillovers, asymmetries, and institutions  |
| Authors: | | Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni Engwerda, Jacob Plasmans, Joseph van Aarle, Bas Michalak, Tomasz |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working papers 1376 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the EMU context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When asymmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination doesn?t produce further gains in policymakers? welfare. |
| Subjects: | | macroeconomic stabilization EMU coalition formation linear quadratic differential games |
| JEL: | | E63 E61 E58 E17 C70 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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