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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18736
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Hakenes, Hendrik | en |
dc.contributor.author | Peitz, Martin | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18736 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality isunknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumersadjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that ifthe probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the firm produceshigh quality under umbrella branding whereas it would sell low quality in the absence ofumbrella branding. Hence, umbrella branding mitigates the moral hazard problem. We alsofind that umbrella branding survives in asymmetric markets and that even unprofitableproducts may be used to stabilize the umbrella brand. However, umbrella branding does notnecessarily imply high quality; the firm may choose low-quality products with positiveprobability. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1373 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M37 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L15 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | umbrella branding | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reputation transfer | en |
dc.subject.keyword | signaling | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experience goods | en |
dc.subject.stw | Absatzkooperation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktqualität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Markenartikel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktimage | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.title | Umbrella branding and the provision of quality | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477512615 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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