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dc.contributor.authorHallett, Andrew Hughesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:31Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:31Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18735-
dc.description.abstractFiscal policy in Britain has changed radically since the Keynesianism of the 1960s and 1970s. After a passive period under monetarism of the 1980s, fiscal policy is said to have adopted a leadership role with long term objectives (low debt, the provision of public services/ investment, and social equity), together with an independent central bank. Monetary policy, operating with instrument independence, then takes care of short run stabilisation. I test this view – confronting it with evidence from the institutional arrangements put in place since 1997; with econometric evidence from the policy responses themselves; and with theoretical evidence on the incentive to choose such a regime in the first place. I conclude that this claim is broadly correct. It appears that the UK?s improved performance is a consequence of the advantages of combining fiscal leadership with an (instrument) independent central bank. The key feature is the ability to trade target (not instrument) independence in monetary policy to secure greater coordination between fiscal and monetary strategies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1372en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelF42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordStackelberg leadershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy complementarityen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutional coordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwReaktionsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwGrossbritannienen_US
dc.titlePost-Thatcher fiscal strategies in the UK : an interpretationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477512178en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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