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Title:Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution PDF Logo
Authors:Simonovits, András
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:CESifo working papers 1370
Abstract:The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
Subjects:flexible retirement
asymmetric information
actuarial fairness (neutrality)
mechanism design
JEL:D82
H55
D91
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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