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dc.contributor.authorMoraga-González, José Luisen_US
dc.contributor.authorViaene, Jean-Marieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:28Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:28Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18728-
dc.description.abstractWe examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium involves intra-industry trade where the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher quality than the domestic firm. This equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping by the foreign firm into the domestic economy. Two instruments of anti-dumping (AD) policy are examined, namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when firms? cost asymmetries are low and countries differ substantially in size, a PU leads to a quality reversal in the international market, which gives a rationale for the domestic government to enact AD law. We also establish an equivalence result between the effects of an AD duty and a PU.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1365en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.jelF12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordanti-dumping dutyen_US
dc.subject.keywordintra-industry tradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordprice undertakingen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct qualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordquality reversalsen_US
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwIntraindustrieller Handelen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktqualitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAnti-dumping, intra-industry trade and quality reversalsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477511473en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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