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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hainz, Christa | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-01-28T15:52:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2009-01-28T15:52:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2004 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working papers 1362 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | credit markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | institutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bank competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | information sharing | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | bankruptcy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | relationship banking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Konkurs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Liquidation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Bankgeschäft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Firmenkundengeschäft | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Asymmetrische Information | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Institutionelle Infrastruktur | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Quality of institutions, credit markets and bankruptcy | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 477509967 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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