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dc.contributor.authorMoraga-González, José Luisen_US
dc.contributor.authorViaene, Jean-Marieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18719-
dc.description.abstractWe build a simple theoretical model to understand why developing and transition economies have increasingly applied anti-dumping laws. To that end, we investigate the strategic incentives of oligopolistic exporting firms to undertake dumping in these economies. We show that dumping may be due to cross-country differences in income, to the extent of tariff protection and to the exchange rate depreciations observed recently. Dumping may arise even if consumers exhaust all arbitrage possibilities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1356en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.jelF12en_US
dc.subject.jelP31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddumpingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexchange rateen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal trade policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct qualityen_US
dc.subject.stwDumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwÜbergangswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwEhemalige sozialistische Staatenen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleDumping in developing and transition economiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477505465en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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