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dc.contributor.authorBerlemann, Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorDittrich, Marcusen_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18715-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by some form of joy of giving. We show that the possibility to make non-binding announcements has a positive effect on cooperative behaviour, especially if individual announcements and factual investments are communicated to the players after each round. We also show that this result holds true even though the players have an incentive to overstate their true degrees of cooperativeness. Altogether, our theoretical considerations point in the direction that revealing as much information on individual intentions and factual behaviour as possible enhances cooperative behaviour. These conclusions are broadly confirmed by the results of a series of classroom experiments we present.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working papers 1352en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordannouncementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordjoy of givingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwAnkündigungseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments : some theory and experimental evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477414303en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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